Neighbor Cache Fingerprinter: Operating System Version Detection with ARP

30 12 2012

I’ve released the first prototype (written in C++) of an Open Source tool called the Neighbor Cache Fingerprinter on Github today. A few months ago, I was watching the output of a lightweight honeypot in a Wireshark capture and noticed that although it had the capability to fool nmap’s operating system scanner into thinking it was a certain operating system, there were subtle differences in the ARP behavior that could be detected. This gave me the idea to explore the possibility of doing OS version detection with nothing except ARP. The holidays provided a perfect time to destroy my sleep schedule and get some work done on this little side project (see commit punchcard, note best work done Sunday at 2:00am).

ncfpunchcard

The tool is currently capable of uniquely identifying the following operating systems,

Windows 7
Windows XP (fingerprint from Service Pack 3)
Linux 3.x (fingerprint from Ubuntu 12.10)
Linux 2.6 (fingerprint from Century Link Q1000 DSL Router)
Linux 2.6 (newer than 2.6.24) (fingerprint from Ubuntu 8.04)
Linux 2.6 (older than 2.6.24) (fingerprint from Knoppix 5)
Linux 2.4 (fingerprint from Damn Small Linux 4.4.10)
FreeBSD 9.0-RELEASE
Android 4.0.4
Android 3.2
Minix 3.2
ReactOS 0.3.13

More operating systems should follow as I get around to spinning up more installs on Virtual Machines and adding to the fingerprints file. Although it’s still a fairly early prototype, I believe it’s already a useful enough tool that it can be beneficial, so install it and let me know via the Github issues page if you find any bugs. There’s very little existing research on this; arp-fingerprint (a perl script that uses arp-scan) is the only thing remotely close, and it attempts to identify the OS only by looking at responses to ARP REQUEST packets. The Neighbor Cache Fingerprinter focuses on sending different types of ARP REPLY packets as well as analyzing several other behavioral quirks of ARP discussed in the notes below.

The main advantage of the Neighbor Cache Fingerprinter versus an Nmap OS scan is that the tool can do OS version detection on a machine that has all closed ports. The next big feature I’m working on is expanding the probe types to allow it to work on machines that respond to ICMP pings, OR have open TCP ports, OR have closed TCP ports, OR have closed UDP ports. The tool just needs the ability to elicit a reply from the target being scanned, and a pong, TCP/RST, TCP/ACK, or ICMP unreachable message will all provide that.

The following are my notes taken from the README file,

Introduction

What is the Neighbor Cache? The Neighbor Cache is an operating system’s mapping of network addresses to link layer addresses maintained and updated via the protocol ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) in IPv4 or NDP (Neighbor Discovery Protocol) in IPv6. The neighbor cache can be as simple as a lookup table updated every time an ARP or NDP reply is seen, to something as complex as a cache that has multiple timeout values for each entry, which are updated based on positive feedback from higher level protocols and usage characteristics of that entry by the operating system’s applications, along with restrictions on malformed or unsolicited update packets.

This tool provides a mechanism for remote operating system detection by extrapolating characteristics of the target system’s underlying Neighbor Cache and general ARP behavior. Given the non-existence of any standard specification for how the Neighbor Cache should behave, there several differences in operating system network stack implementations that can be used for unique identification.

Traditional operating system fingerprinting tools such as Nmap and Xprobe2 rely on creating fingerprints from higher level protocols such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP. The downside of these tools is that they usually require open TCP ports and responses to ICMP probes. This tool works by sending a TCP SYN packet to a port which can be either open or closed. The target machine will either respond with a SYN/ACK packet or a SYN/RST packet, but either way it must first discover the MAC address to send the reply to via queries to the ARP Neighbor Cache. This allows for fingerprinting on target machines that have nothing but closed TCP ports and give no ICMP responses.

The main disadvantage of this tool versus traditional fingerprinting is that because it’s based on a Layer 2 protocol instead of a Layer 3 protocol, the target machine that is being tested must reside on the same Ethernet broadcast domain (usually the same physical network). It also has the disadvantage of being fairly slow compared to other OS scanners (a scan can take ~5 minutes).

Fingerprint Technique: Number of ARP Requests

When an operating system performs an ARP query it will often resend the request multiple times in case the request or the reply was lost. A simple count of the number of requests that are sent can provide a fingerprint feature. In addition, there can be differences in the number of responses to open and closed ports due to multiple retries on the higher level protocols, and attempting to send a probe multiple times can result in different numbers of ARP requests (Android will initially send 2 ARP requests, but the second time it will only send 1).

For example,

Windows XP: Sends 1 request

Windows 7: Sends 3 if probe to closed port (9 if probe to open port)

Linux: Sends 3 requests

Android 3: Sends 2 requests the first probe, then 1 request after
A minimum and maximum number of requests seen is recorded in the fingerprint.

Fingerprint Technique: Timing of ARP Request Retries

On hosts that retry ARP requests, the timing values can be used to deduce more information. Linux hosts generally have a constant retry time of 1 second, while Windows hosts generally back off on the timing, sending their first retry after between 500ms and 1s, and their second retry after 1 second.

The fingerprint contains the minimum time difference between requests seen, maximum time difference, and a boolean value indicating if the time differences are constant or changing.

Fingerprint Technique: Time before cache entry expires

After a proper request/reply ARP exchange, the Neighbor Cache gets an entry put in it for the IP address and for a certain amount of time communication will continue without additional ARP requests. At some point, the operating system will decide the entry in the cache is stale and make an attempt to update it by sending a new ARP request.

To test this a SYN packet is sent, an ARP exchange happens, and then SYN packets are sent once per second until another ARP request is seen.

Operating system response examples,

Windows XP : Timeout after 10 minutes (if referred to)

Windows 7/Vista/Server 2008 : Timeout between 15 seconds and 45 seconds

Freebsd : Timeout after 20 minutes

Linux : Timeout usually around 30 seconds
More research needs to be done on the best way to capture the values of delay_first_probe_time and differences between stale timing and actually falling out of the table and being gc’ed in Linux.

Waiting 20 minutes to finish the OS scan is unfeasible in most cases, so the fingerprinting mode only waits about 60 seconds. This may be changed later to make it easier to detect an oddity in older windows targets where cache entries expire faster if they aren’t used (TODO).

Fingerprint Technique: Response to Gratuitous ARP Replies

A gratuitous or unsolicited ARP reply is an ARP reply for which there was no request. The usual use case for this is notification of machines on the network of IP changes or systems coming online. The problem for implementers is that several of the fields in the ARP packet no longer make much sense.

Who is the Target Protocol Address for the ARP packet? The broadcast address? Zero? The specification surprisingly says neither: the target Protocol address should be the same IP address as the Sender Protocol Address.

When there’s no specific target for the ARP packet, the Target Hardware Address also becomes a confusing field. The specification says it’s value shouldn’t matter, but should be set to zero. However, most implementations will use the Ethernet broadcast address of FF:FF:FF:FF:FF instead, because internally they have some function to send an ARP reply that only takes one argument for the destination MAC address (and is put in both the Ethernet frame destination and the ARP packet’s Target Hardware Address). We can also experiment with setting the Target Hardware Address to the same thing as the Sender Hardware Address (the same method the spec says to use for the Target Protocol field).

Even the ARP opcode becomes confusing in the case of unsolicited ARP packets. Is it a “request” for other machines to update their cache? Or is it a “reply”, even though it isn’t a reply to anything? Most operating systems will update their cache no matter the opcode.

There are several variations of the gratuitous ARP packet that can be generated by changing the following fields,

Ethernet Frame Destination Address : Bcast or the MAC of our target

ARP Target Hardware Address : 0, bcast, or the MAC of our target

ARP Target Protocol Address : 0 or the IP address of our target

ARP Opcode : REPLY or REQUEST
This results in 36 different gratuitous packet permutations.

Most operating systems have the interesting behavior that they will ignore gratuitous ARP packets if the sender is not in the Neighbor Cache already, but if the sender is in the Neighbor Cache, they will update the MAC address, and in some operating systems also update the timeouts.
The following sequence shows the testing technique for this feature,

Send ARP packet that is known to update most caches with srcmac = srcMacArg Send gratuitous ARP packet that is currently being tested with srcmac = srcMacArg + 1 Send probe packet with a source MAC address of srcMacArg in the Ethernet frame

The first packet attempts to get the cache entry into a known state: up to date and storing the source MAC address that is our default or the command line argument –srcmac. The following ARP packet is the actual probe permutation that’s being tested.

If the reply to the probe packet is to (srcMacArg + 1), then we know the gratuitous packet successfully updated the cache entry. If the reply to the probe is just (srcMacArg), then we know the cache was not updated and still contains the old value.

The reason the Ethernet frame source MAC address in the probe is set to the original srcMacArg is to ensure the target isn’t just replying to the MAC address it sees packets from and is really pulling the entry out of ARP.

Sometimes the Neighbor Cache entry will get into a state that makes it ignore gratuitous packets even though, given a normal state, it would accept them and update the entry. This can result in some timing related result changes. For now I haven’t made an attempt to fix this as it’s actually useful as a fingerprinting method in itself.

Fingerprint Technique: Can we get put into the cache with a gratuitous packet?

As mentioned in the last section, most operating systems won’t add a new entry to the cache given a gratuitous ARP packet, but they will update existing entries. One of the few differences between Windows XP and FreeBSD’s fingerprint is that we can place an entry in the cache by sending a certain gratuitous packet to a FreeBSD machine, and test if it was in the cache by seeing if a probe gets a response or not.

Fingerprint Technique: ARP Flood Prevention (Ignored rapid ARP replies)

RFC1122 (Requirements for Internet Hosts) states,

“A mechanism to prevent ARP flooding (repeatedly sending an ARP Request for the same IP address, at a high rate) MUST be included. The recommended maximum rate is 1 per second per destination.”

Linux will not only ignore duplicate REQUEST packets within a certain time, but also duplicate REPLY packets. We can test this by sending a set of unsolicited ARP replies within a short time range with difference MAC addresses being reported by each reply. Sending a probe will reveal in the probe response destination MAC address if the host responds to the first MAC address we ARPed or the last, indicating if it ignored the later rapid replies.

Fingerprint Technique: Correct Reply to RFC5227 ARP Probe

This test sends an “ARP Probe” as defined by RFC 5227 (IPv4 Address Conflict Detection) and checks the response to see if it confirms to the specification. The point of the ARP Probe is to check if an IP address is being used without the risk of accidentally causing someone’s ARP cache to update with your own MAC address when it sees your query. Given that you’re likely trying to tell if an IP address is being used because you want to claim it, you likely don’t have an IP address of your own yet, so the Sender Protocol Address field is set to 0 in the ARP REQUEST.

The RFC specifies the response as,

“(the probed host) MAY elect to attempt to defend its address by … broadcasting one single ARP Announcement, giving its own IP and hardware addresses as the sender addresses of the ARP, with the ‘target IP address’ set to its own IP address, and the ‘target hardware address’ set to all zeroes.”

But any Linux kernel older than 2.6.24 and some other operating systems will respond incorrectly, with a packet that has tpa == spa and tha == sha. Checking if tpa == 0 has proven sufficient for a boolean fingerprint feature.

TODO RESEARCH IN PROGRESS Fingerprint Technique

Feedback from higher protocols extending timeout values

Linux has the ability to extend timeout values if there’s positive feedback from higher level protocols, such as a 3 way TCP handshake. Need to write tests for this and do some source diving in the kernel to see what else counts besides a 3 way handshake for positive feedback.

TODO RESEARCH IN PROGRESS Fingerprint Technique

Infer Neighbor Cache size by flooding to cause entry dumping

Can we fill the ARP table with garbage entries in order for it to start dumping old ones? Can we reliably use this to infer the table size, even with Linux’s near random cache garbage collection rules? Can we do this on class A networks, or do we really need class B network subnets in order to make this a viable test?

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Outraged at Respondus LockDown Browser

27 03 2009

Welcome to another post of me being outraged at something college related. This time, it is about the RespondusLockDown Browser and it’s usage at ASU. What this software essentially does is cripple your operating system while you are taking an online test or quiz with BlackBoard. You can’t copy, paste, print, access the taskbar, switch applications, close the application, or run anything on a list of about 250 programs that have been deemed bad (including paint) while taking your test.

According to the article, ASU payed $2,372 to use this software for the fiscal year. At a time where there are constant threats of tution increases and program closures, this is something ASU is spending money on?

First off, the software is useless if anyone using it has half a brain (and we’re college students, meaning supposedly we have that). Listing the first 3 things that come to mind, starting with the skill level of hacker guru and going to the skill level of someone who’s 10 years old,

Sniff packets and fool whatever page your accessing that you’re really using the browser when you aren’t.

Run it under VMware and take screenshots, surf the web, etc, all you want while taking your test.

Just use two computers, Google with one, take test with the other.

So essentially, anyone who wants to get around it, easily could. That said, the entire thing is just going to burden and annoy large amounts of honest students. What happens if your Wifi cuts out when taking the test? You can’t access the taskbar, can’t close the application, can’t get to your wireless or network settings, and are essentially screwed while the clock ticks down to 0 on the test you can’t finish. In that case, I could go complain to the teacher and get them to let me retake the test, unless of course he’s the paranoid type who thinks everyone is cheating and wants to run software on their computers to prevent accessing things like their printer during an exam. Oh shit…

If you want students to not have access to the Internet while taking a test or quiz, do not administer it on the Internet! It’s as simple as that. Using BlackBoard for tests and quizzes is essentially open book and open notes anyway, so even if you make it harder to access the Internet, it’s just as easy to “cheat”. The level of stupidity of whoever thought it was a good idea, or for that matter, would actually do anything useful, boggles my mind.

Purposely installing a piece of software that not only has the ability to, but has the purpose of crippling my operating system, is just utterly ridiculous. Why would I ever install something that does this,

  • Assessments are displayed full-screen and cannot be minimized
  • Assessments cannot be exited until submitted by users for grading
  • Task switching or access to other applications is prevented
  • Printing functions are disabled
  • Print Screen and capturing functions are disabled
  • Copying and pasting anything to and from an assessment is prohibited
  • Right-click menu options are disabled
  • Browser menu and toolbar options are disabled, except for Back, Forward, Refresh and Stop
  • Function keys are disabled
  • Source code for the HTML page cannot be viewed
  • Over 250 screen capture, messaging, screen-sharing and network monitoring applications are blocked from running
  • The browser automatically starts at the login page for the institution’s course management system
  • URLs cannot be typed by the user
  • External links don’t compromise the “locked” testing environment
  • Pages from the assessment aren’t cached or stored in Internet Explorer’s history listing
  • Assessments that are set up for use with Respondus LockDown Browser cannot be accessed with other browsers.

It sounds like a virus, not a piece of software for educational institutions.